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Abstract Following Russian intervention and a referendum held on 16th March
2014, the Ukrainian republic of Crimea became incorporated within Russia. The
Crimean episode marked just the latest in a series of situations arising in former
Soviet states in which secessionist movements within disaffected territorial units
were able to advance their causes aided by Russian external intervention. These
situations raise significant international legal issues pertaining to secession by
component parts of existing states, underpinned by external intervention. The
unwillingness of the international community to recognise Russia’s incorporation of
Crimea, similar to its earlier rejection of the purported secession of South Ossetia
and Abkhazia from Georgia, reinforces the widely held view that non-consensual
secession must be grounded in exceptional circumstances which were found to be
lacking in all of these situations. It also reaffirms the principle that territorial
changes brought about by external intervention will not be recognised. However,
while legal assessments of these incidents may appear prima facie straightforward,
they cannot be entirely divorced from the wider political phenomenon of ethnic
conflict in former Soviet states and tensions existing in those states between factions
seeking to further European integration and those prioritising strengthening rela-
tions with Russia. The international legal reasoning employed by the key protag-
onists must be understood with reference to this wider context.
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Introduction
On 16th March 2014, following tensions culminating in Russian intervention, a
referendum was held within the Ukrainian republic of Crimea in which an
overwhelming majority of those taking part purportedly voted in favour of Crimea’s
secession from Ukraine and integration within Russia. Two days later, the Kremlin
proclaimed that Crimea was now part of Russia. By this point, Ukrainian authorities
had effectively ceased to exercise any control over the territory, Russian military
reinforcements in Crimea following its purported incorporation within the Russian
Federation having ensured the departure of the remaining Ukrainian military
contingents. These developments were roundly condemned by both Ukrainian
authorities and large sections of the international community who regard Crimea’s
purported secession as little more than a case of unlawful annexation by Russia. By
contrast, Russia—and evidently a clear majority of the Crimean population—
considers union with Russia a legitimate expression of the will of the inhabitants of
Crimea, many of whom are ethnic Russians and enjoy a strong historic connection
with Russia.
Since Crimea’s incorporation within Russia, other pro-Russian separatist
movements have gained strength in the eastern regions of Donetsk and Luhansk,
seizing control in those areas and holding so-called referenda in which those
administering them claim overwhelming majorities in favour of independence from
Ukraine (with some overtures towards possible ultimate union with Russia). The
situations in these regions remain unresolved as they continue to be beset by conflict
between Ukrainian military forces and Russian-backed separatist groups.
Russia’s intervention in Crimea and its purported secession from Ukraine cannot
be considered in isolation, but must rather be understood in the context of a series of
secessionist pressures within former Soviet republics where Russia has also
intervened. It has been noted that, ‘‘Crimea followed on from South Ossetia and
Abkhazia as the third in a trio of ‘similar cases’.’’1 There are certainly some striking
comparisons to be drawn with South Ossetia and Abkhazia,2 regions within Georgia
which, supported by Russian intervention, have proclaimed their independence and
currently operate as de facto states notwithstanding the almost universal refusal of
the international community to recognise them. Reference to South Ossetia and
Abkhazia will be relevant throughout the substantive treatment of issues concerning
Crimea.
The international legal issues raised by events in Crimea, as well as South Ossetia
and Abkhazia, are far from insignificant. This paper seeks to explore the issue of
Crimea’s purported secession from Ukraine during 2014 against a backdrop of
external intervention by Russia. We consider this event primarily with reference to
the relevant international legal norms, but also within its geopolitical context. We
begin by providing some historical context to events in Crimea; in light of the
similarities between the cases, by way of background to understanding Russian
1 Navari (2014: 1313).
2 Navari (2014: 1314) notes that all three secessionist entities ‘‘claimed varying degrees of political
suppression and subjection to the threat and use of violence’’.
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claims made in respect of Crimea, we briefly outline the course of events in South
Ossetia and Abkhazia leading to their de facto independence from Georgia. The
development of Crimea’s status through the Soviet era to the present day is then
detailed. Attention is then given to the concept of secession in international law and
the relevant framework applicable to its exercise, before more specifically to the
question of whether Crimea could stake an entitlement under international law to
secede from Ukraine. We also consider Russia’s involvement in events, and the
extent to which this is unlawful and effectively give rise to the annexation of
Crimea. Finally, the geopolitical factors relevant to an understanding of the Crimean
episode, and the manner in which these have informed the legal arguments
employed by the key actors involved, are considered, as well as some of the
inconsistencies in legal discourse which they highlight.
Historical Background
A Note on South Ossetia and Abkhazia
As has already been noted, the Crimean episode bears some resemblance to earlier
developments within the Georgian provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and
reference to those developments will be helpful in providing some context to the
more recent events in Crimea. South Ossetia is a semi-autonomous region within
Georgia, the population of which is predominantly ethnically Ossetian, a group
divided between South Ossetia in Georgia and North Ossetia in Russia. Ethnic
Georgians comprise only a minority group within South Ossetia, albeit a sizeable
one.3 The Ossetian people are of Iranian origin and enjoy a distinctive culture,
language, and history of self-rule.4 South Ossetia had been under Russian rule
during the nineteenth century,5 and although always part of Georgia during the
Soviet era, the population of South Ossetia have a long history of good relations
with Russia,6 it being home to the larger share of the ethnic Ossetian population
within the region. In the post-Cold War era tensions between South Ossetia and
Georgia have always been present. Surveys have revealed significant levels of
mutual distrust between Georgians and South Ossetians,7 and following conflict
between South Ossetian and Georgian forces in the early 1990s, a Russian led
peacekeeping presence was deployed to South Ossetia.8 On a number of occasions
South Ossetia sought to advance the cause of independence. Having declared its
sovereignty in 1990, in a 1992 referendum its population backed independence and
3 Approximately 20–30 % at the time of the outbreak of the August 2008 war. See Toomey (2009:
445–449).
4 See the BBC profile for South Ossetia, www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-18269210. See also Higgins
and O’Reilly (2009: 580).
5 See NuBberger (2009: 351).
6 See Toomey (2009: 445–449).
7 Higgins and O’Reilly (2009: 568–570).
8 See Petro (2008: 1528–1533).
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from that point South Ossetia effectively functioned de facto independently of
Georgian authority, reiterating its independence again on further occasions.9
Tensions heightened following Georgian President Saakashvili’s push to reassert
Georgian sovereignty over South Ossetia,10 leading to a full-blown war between
Georgian and Russian/South Ossetian forces during August 2008.11 Both sides
traded blame for the violence,12 which ended after 5 days. South Ossetia’s
declaration of independence at this time was recognised by Russia,13 although
heavily condemned by the international community at large which still regards it as
de jure part of Georgia.14
Like South Ossetia, Abkhazia is a semi-autonomous region within Georgia which
has experienced tensions with its parent state.15 For a long time Abkhazia was an
independent territory, before becoming subsumed within first the Osman empire,
then from 1810 onwards the Russian empire. Within the Soviet Union, it was
initially a separate republic until its integration within Georgia by decree of Stalin in
1931. The Abkhaz people have little in common with either Russia or Georgia,
enjoying a distinct culture and language, and being adherents of Islam.16 As the
USSR began to dissolve, tensions increased and Abkhazia asserted its indepen-
dence, conflict breaking out with Georgia in 1992. A Russian brokered agreement
restored peace in 1994,17 although like South Ossetia, Abkhazia has effectively
operated as a de facto independent state since. Its status was strengthened in 2008
when conflict in South Ossetia spread to Abkhazia, and Russia recognised
Abkhazian independence at the same time that it extended recognition to South
Ossetia.
Crimea
The area comprising present day Crimea has been controlled by various groups
throughout its history.18 For centuries predominantly populated by Crimean
Tatars,19 it came under full Russian control in the late eighteenth century.20 Crimea
remained part of Russia into the Soviet era until it was transferred to the Ukraine in
9 For example, in a 2006 referendum, 95 % purportedly backed independence. See, eg., ‘South Ossetians
vote for independence’, The Guardian, 13 November 2006, www.theguardian.com/world/2006/nov/13/
russia.georgia.
10 See Chatham (2011: 77–78).
11 For brief details, see Toomey (2009: 450–452).
12 See Musselman (2010: 322–324) and NuBberger (2009: 345–346).
13 See Higgins and O’Reilly (2009: 571–573).
14 See Musselman (2010: 325–329).
15 See the BBC profile for Abkhazia, www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-18175030.
16 See Davies (1997: 816).
17 See NuBberger (2009: 361–362).
18 Wydra (2004: 112).
19 See Magosi (1996: 172–178).
20 See Wydra (2004: 112).
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1954.21 While the population remained largely Russian, the 1954 transition was
mainly symbolic given that both Russia and Ukraine belonged to the same sovereign
state, the USSR. While Ukraine remained relatively peaceful as early post-Cold War
secessionist conflicts flared up in other ex-Soviet states, including Georgia,22
Crimea was nonetheless identified as one potential source of tension at that time,
one observer noting that, ‘‘The Crimea has been specifically referred to as, ‘one of
the most sensitive regions in South-Eastern Europe’’’, adding that ‘‘there is fear that
it will turn into yet another ‘hot spot’ in the growing list of ethnic conflicts
throughout Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.’’23
A key factor in the secessionist threat within Crimea has undoubtedly been the
existence of a sizeable ethnic Russian population.24 In the early years of Ukrainian
independence post-Cold War, concessions were made to Crimea in respect of
political, cultural and economic autonomy,25 although relative stability prevailed
until the events of early 2014. These events have to be understood against the
backdrop of East–West tensions in Ukraine. Since the dissolution of the USSR, the
country has experienced tensions between its broadly pro-European western regions
which demonstrate greater support for Ukraine’s attempt to attain membership of
the European Union and move the country towards integration within European
political structures, such as NATO, and its broadly pro-Russian eastern regions
which favour the retention of close relations with Russia.26
The so-called ‘Euromaidan’ movement began in November 2013 with protests
against the government of President Viktor Yanyukovych, after he reneged on plans
to sign a comprehensive trade agreement with the European Union.27 Beginning as
peaceful protests, the uprisings in the capital, Kiev, intensified in February 2014 and
culminated in Parliament’s impeachment of President Yanyukovych, his departure
from the country, and the installation of an interim government pending new
elections.28 In late February, in response to these developments, seen as designed to
reassert efforts to strengthen Ukraine’s relations with the EU, pro-Russian armed
groups occupied and took control of Crimea. On 6th March Crimea’s Parliament
approved the holding of a referendum which would give citizens the option of union
21 See Magosi (1996: 653).
22 On some of these post-Soviet secessionist conflicts, see, eg., Gaweda and Siddi (2012); Sterio (2013:
130–160) (on Chechnya, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia).
23 Chase (1996: 220).
24 According to the 2001 Ukrainian census, ethnic Russians accounted for 58 % of the population of
Crimea, http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/results/general/nationality/. See also Bugajski (2000:
173–175).
25 See Chase (1996: 223) and Wydra (2004: 121–129). See also Sasse (2002).
26 See, eg., White et al. (2010). On ethnic and national identity more generally within post-Soviet
Ukraine, see Liber (1998) and Nemyria (1999).
27 ‘Ukraine rally over EU agreement delay’, BBC News Online, 25 November 2013, www.bbc.co.uk/
news/world-europe-25083801.
28 See ‘Ukrainian MPs vote to oust President Yanyukovych’, BBC News Online, 24 February 2014,
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-26304842. On the sequence of events leading up to Crimea’s
incorporation within Russia, see Smith and Harari (2014: 1). In new presidential elections held on 25 May
2014, Petro Poroshenko was elected as Ukraine’s President.
Secession and Intervention in the Former Soviet Space:… 157
123
with Russia or enhanced autonomy.29 In that referendum, a reported 96 % backed
union with Russia,30 and 2 days later the Kremlin proclaimed Crimea part of Russia,
President Putin placing much emphasis upon their historic links.31 The Kiev
government, the EU, US and other major international actors regarded the action as
unlawful,32 and Russia was suspended from the G8.33 UN Security Council
condemnation of the action was only prevented by Russia’s exercise of its power of
veto,34 while the UN General Assembly (by a vote of 100 to 11 with 58 abstentions)
called upon states not to recognize any change in Crimea’s status.35 Factually, the
incorporation of Crimea within Russia is a fait accompli, although it also sparked
off a wave of secessionist pressures within Eastern Ukraine as large swathes of areas
with large ethnic Russian populations, Donetsk and Luhansk, fell under the control
of armed separatist groups sympathetic to Russia.36 These areas have subsequently
held referendums on their future status,37 which remains unresolved amidst
continued armed conflict.
The Case for Secession or Irredentism
Secession has been defined as ‘‘the effort of a group or section of a state to withdraw
itself from the political or constitutional authority of that state.’’38 There has been a
tendency to apply the term ‘‘secession’’ to those instances in which territorial
entities break away from their parent state and assert their independent statehood.39
Where a territorial entity breaks away from its parent state in order to join another
state—usually with which it shares ethnic, national, religious or linguistic
characteristics and/or a strong historical connection—that process is generally
considered an instance of irredentism. That Crimea has purported to form a union
29 See Shuster (2014: 20–25).
30 ‘Crimea referendum: Voters ‘back Russia union’, BBC News Online, 16 March 2014, www.bbc.co.uk/
news/world-europe-26606097.
31 Putin stated that, ‘‘Everything in Crimea speaks of our shared history and pride…In people’s hearts
and minds, Crimea has always been an inseparable part of Russia.’’ See President Putin’s Speech of 18
March 2014, available at the Kremlin website, http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/6889.
32 See, eg., ‘Ukraine Crisis: Russia isolated in UN Crimea vote’, BBC News Online, 15 March 2014,
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-26595776.
33 See ‘G8 suspends Russia for annexation of Crimea’, The Telegraph, 24 March 2014, www.telegraph.
co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/10720297/G8-suspends-Russia-for-annexation-of-Crimea.html.
34 UN Doc. S/2014/189; UN Doc. S/PV.7138. 13 members of the Council backed the condemnatory
resolution, China abstaining.
35 GA Res 68/262. See also UN Doc. GA/11493.
36 See, eg., ‘Pro-Russian rebels vow to take control of infrastructure across Donetsk region’, The
Guardian, 14 April 2014, www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/14/ukraine-deadline-pro-russian-rebels-
passes.
37 ‘Ukraine rebels hold referendums in Donetsk and Luhansk’, BBC News Online, 11 May 2014, www.
bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-27360146.
38 Reference re Secession of Quebec, 2 SCR [1998] 217, at para. 83.
39 See, eg., above, where the decision goes on to define secession as a process directed towards the
achievement of independent statehood on the part of the seceding entity.
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with Russia—unlike Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which have declared their own
independent statehood—might suggest that the latter term is more suited to its
treatment within the present discussion. However, it is contended that framing
consideration of the Crimean episode within the parameters of discourse on
secession is appropriate for two principal reasons. First, ‘‘secession’’ implies a
breaking off from an existing territorial relationship. While it may result in
independence, it can also serve as a precursor to union with another state. Indeed,
some international lawyers have defined secession to encompass such an outcome.40
The legal principles which govern secession are therefore equally applicable to
processes resulting in entities breaking away from one state and joining another.
Second, there has been very little treatment of irredentism as a separate legal
concept,41 probably owing largely to the fact that there have been so few situations
in which a territorial unit seeks union with another state as opposed to outright
independence.
There is a considerable degree of consensus that while international law does not
explicitly prohibit secession by entities within existing states, nor does it provide
any general right of secession.42 Where secession takes place with the consent of the
state which is losing a part of its territory—as for example occurred when South
Sudan seceded from Sudan43—there is no great difficulty in legal terms. However,
where secession is attempted against the will of the parent state it becomes
necessary from a perspective of legitimacy to base this in some normative legal
principles, not least in order to generate international recognition of the new
arrangements. The limited international recognition of Crimea’s absorption within
Russia,44 and of Abkhaz and South Ossetian independence,45 suggests that the legal
basis for these actions is considered lacking.
States have approached non-consensual secession cautiously.46 As Jaber has
noted, ‘‘although states have consistently upheld the right to secession where it is
the product of a consensual arrangement with the state, they have generally not
accepted unilateral secessions that violate the territorial integrity of independent
states.’’47 Furthermore, it has been suggested that the ‘‘historical criteria for
international recognition of claims of secession include the approval of the state
from which the entity in question is seceding, the degree of repression within the
larger state, historical claims of independence, the extent to which the seceding
40 See, eg., Dugard and Raic (2006: 101–102).
41 For discussion, however, in the context of Somalia, Germany and Cyprus, see Musgrave (1997:
211–229).
42 See, eg., Quebec decision, paras. 111–112.
43 For discussion, see Sheeran (2011) and Vidmar (2011–2012).
44 As of April 2014, Crimea had only been recognised as part of Russia by Afghanistan, Cuba,
Nicaragua, North Korea, Syria, and Venezuela.
45 Abkhazia and South Ossetia are only recognised as independent states by Russia, Nicaragua,
Venezuela, and Nauru.
46 See Halperin and Scheffer (1992: 13–16) and Crawford (2006: 388–391).
47 Jaber (2011: 934). See also Crawford (1998). Orakhelashvili (2008: 1) notes that even in the early
post-Cold War era, where 21 new states rapidly came into existence, the principle that no entity may
secede without the consent of its parent state retained validity.
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region has exhausted possibilities of a negotiated settlement of its disputes, the
ability of the new state to maintain internal order and defend its borders, and the
extent to which secession would be destabilizing.’’48 The case of Bangladesh
appears to have been the only instance in which a seceding entity has been given the
legitimation of international recognition against the will of the parent state,49
although a more recent precedent might be found in respect of the large number of
states to have recognized Kosovo.50
From the standpoint of international law, the starting point from which attempts
to identify norms which might legitimate acts of secession might be made has
usually been the principle of self-determination.51 Indeed, Russia sought to
legitimise Crimea’s secession from Ukraine by reference to the principle of external
self-determination.52 Whereas the principle’s ‘internal’ dimension effectively refers
to the right of a state’s population to determine their own political system and form
of government,53 ‘external’ self-determination concerns the process by which a
territorial unit removes itself from the sovereign authority of its parent state,
whether by seceding to form a newly independent state or through union with
another state. Although its philosophical and political origins can be traced much
earlier,54 self-determination as a legal principle was developed through a series of
UN General Assembly resolutions.55 It was at least initially conceived as a principle
applicable to the decolonisation process in the post-World War Two period,56 and
has been recognised by the ICJ as ‘‘one of the essential principles of contemporary
international law.’’57 The initial focus on decolonisation was evident in the language
of General Assembly resolutions 1514 and 1541, the former being proclaimed a
‘‘declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples’’ and
requiring immediate steps to confer independence on trust and non-self governing
territories.58 Clearly, any right to self-determination restricted to colonial peoples
would be of no relevance to the populations of Crimea, Abkhazia or South Ossetia
48 Chase (1996: 232).
49 For discussion, see Buchheit (1978: 198–214), Meadwell (1999), Jaber (2011: 939–940) and Nanda
(1980).
50 108 UN Member States had recognised Kosovo as of 15th April 2014. For references to their various
declarations of recognition, see www.kosovothanksyou.com/. The literature on Kosovo is voluminous.
The more detailed treatments include Orakhelashvili (2008), Koeck et al. (2009), Weller (2009) and
Summers (2011).
51 The long history of the idea of self-determination is beyond our present scope. For an overview, see
Summers (2007: 83).
52 See, eg., UN Doc. S/PV.7144, at 8; UN Doc. A/68/PV.80, at 3, for Russian statements to this effect.
These are detailed in Christakis (2015).
53 On the nature of internal self-determination, see Halperin and Scheffer (1992: 16–20); Summers
(2013); Quebec decision, paras. 17, 33–39.
54 See Musgrave (1997: 15–31); Summers (2007).
55 See GA Res. 1514 (1960); GA Res 1541 (1960); GA Res 2625 (1970).
56 See, eg., Halperin and Scheffer (1992: 20–25), Cassese (1995: ch3) and Crawford (2006: 107–131).
57 East Timor (Portugal v Australia), ICJ Rep, 1995, 91, at para. 29. For further discussion of self-
determination’s consideration by the ICJ, see Musgrave (1997: 77–90).
58 Para. 5. Resolution1541 defined with greater clarity the obligations imposed by resolution 1514.
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as they do not constitute colonial entities. However, although some scholars
consider self-determination to have no application outside of the colonial context,59
there is a considerable degree of support for its relevance in a wider context. Such
an understanding of its scope is largely based upon an interpretation of the so-called
‘saving clause’ of the Friendly Relations declaration of the UN General Assembly,
which provides that:
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or
encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part,
the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States
conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and
self-determination of peoples as described above and thus possessed of a
government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without
distinction as to race, creed, or colour.’60
While beginning with a presumption against the dismemberment or impairment
of the territory of an existing state, the latter part of the provision has been taken to
suggest that where a state in a non-colonial setting does not afford equal protection
or representation to all of its citizens, then in certain defined circumstances a
sufficiently disadvantaged group within that state may have a right of ‘remedial’
secession. Effectively, because it has been unable to exercise a right of internal self-
determination through adequate participation and representation within the state’s
political structures, the right to self-determination can only be exercised externally
through an act of ‘‘divorce’’ from the state; secession. While there is some support
for such a view,61 there is no clear consensus upon this matter,62 although it is
suggested that support for ‘remedial secession’ has grown in recent times.63 Without
clearly defined criteria, there is obviously a danger that acknowledging a right to
secede opens the door to a broad range of claims from various dissatisfied minority
groupings. The main areas of debate concern the form of action on the part of the
parent state which will give rise to a right of secession for an oppressed group, and
who constitutes a ‘people’ capable of exercising such a right.
While self-determination is stated within the various instruments to be a right of
‘‘peoples’’, there is no universal definition as to who constitutes a ‘‘people’’ for such
purposes. Resolution 2625 itself makes reference to ‘‘race, creed, or colour’’ as
characteristics of a people, and those attempts that have been made to define the
term ‘‘peoples’’ for self-determination purposes have tended to make reference to a
group’s shared ethnicity, language, religion, historical tradition, culture or territorial
59 See, eg., Buchheit (1978: 87), who argues that ‘‘The history of United Nations practice lends
substantial support to the thesis that the principle of self-determination…is primarily a vehicle for
decolonization, not an authorization of secession.’’
60 GA Res. 2625 (1970).
61 See, eg., Quebec decision, paras. 111–139. The content of the ‘saving clause’ was also reiterated by
the Vienna Declaration of 1993. See World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and
Programme of Action, UN Doc. A/CONF.157/23, para. 2.
62 For a critique of the doctrine of remedial secession, see Del Mar (2013: 79). See also Hilpold (2009:
55).
63 Weller (2008: 59).
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connection.64 A UNESCO definition set out seven shared characteristics of a people,
including a common historical tradition, racial or ethnic identity, cultural
homogeneity, linguistic unity, and religious or ideological affinity.65 Similar criteria
were outlined by the International Commission of Jurists in the context of
Bangladesh’s secession from Pakistan.66 It is further suggested that to qualify as a
‘‘people’’ a group should satisfy both objective and subjective elements: that it
objectively shares a number of the characteristics mentioned above, and that it
subjectively considers itself to be a people.67
Categorizing the population of Crimea as a ‘‘people’’ in accordance with such
criteria is problematic. While Ethnic Russians comprise a clear majority of the
territory’s population according to the most recent census (58 %), Ukrainians and
Tatars comprise sizeable proportions also (24 and 12 % respectively),68 and it is
difficult to speak of any single homogenous group of people which overwhelmingly
represents the identity of Crimea. It could be said that more than one ‘‘people’’
inhabit Crimea. There are significant divisions in terms of national identity and
language. Any purported assertion of a right to external self-determination is also
being largely advanced by the Ethnic Russian population, which cannot alone
represent the population of Crimea at large.69 This is in marked contrast to, say, the
situation in Kosovo where Kosovar Albanians accounted for 90 % of the province’s
population at the time of its declaration of independence from Serbia. That 96 % of
those voting in the March 16th referendum purportedly backed secession from the
Ukraine is of little consequence given doubts over the reliability of the poll, disputes
over the actual turnout and that those groups opposed to secession seem to have
boycotted the referendum in large numbers.70 Similar difficulties apply to attempts
to categorise the populations of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as ‘‘peoples’’ for the
purposes of assessing their earlier attempts to secede from Georgia. Until relatively
recently, ethnic Georgians were the largest single population group in Abkhazia,71
and while their numbers have declined considerably since the outbreak of conflict,
ethnic Abkhazs only account for just over half of the territory’s population,
64 See, eg., McCorquodale (1994: 866) and Knop (2002).
65 International Meeting of Experts on Further Study of the Concept of the Rights of Peoples, convened
by UNESCO, Paris 27-30 November 1989, SHS 89/CONF.602/7, para. 23. The other characteristics listed
were territorial connection and common economic life.
66 Secretariat of the International Commission of Jurists (1972: 70).
67 Sterio (2013: 16–18).
68 2001 Ukrainian Census.
69 The issue of determining the existence of a ‘people’ for self-determination purposes is even more
problematic in the cases of Donetsk and Luhansk, where ethnic Russians account for a minority of the
population as a whole, and the ethnic Ukrainian share of the population is considerably larger than in
Crimea.
70 See, eg., ‘Crimea’s referendumwas a sham display of democracy’, The Guardian, 17March 2014, www.
theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/mar/17/crimea-referendum-sham-display-democracy-ukraine.




Georgians forming the second largest group, and Armenians the third.72 Although
larger, the ethnic Ossetian population of South Ossetia only accounted for an
estimated 67 % of the territory’s population at the time of its purported secession in
2008, ethnic Georgians still then representing a sizeable 25 % of the overall
population.73
Notwithstanding serious doubts over whether there existed ‘peoples’ capable of
exercising a right of secession in the cases of Crimea, South Ossetia and Abkhazia,
it is unlikely that the circumstances necessary for any such right to have become
exercisable had arisen. Any right to remedial secession generally arises only in
extreme circumstances. A group exercising it must be able to point to severe
instances of human rights abuses or acts of oppression directed against them by state
authorities.74 Cassese argues that secession might be warranted where, ‘‘[T]he
central authorities of a sovereign state persistently refuse to grant participatory
rights to a religious or racial group, grossly and systematically trample upon their
fundamental rights, and deny the possibility of reaching a peaceful settle-
ment…there must be gross breaches of fundamental human rights.’’75 Similarly,
Weller suggests that a right of remedial secession will arise ‘‘where the central
government persistently and systematically represses a territorially organised, and
perhaps also constitutionally recognised, segment of the population…’’ or subjects
that group to ‘‘persistent and discriminatory exclusion from governance.’’76 In the
Quebec case, the Canadian Supreme Court envisaged a possible right of secession in
circumstances where a group is ‘‘subject to alien subjugation, domination or
exploitation.’’77 It is very difficult to establish the existence of such circumstances in
respect of the treatment of Crimea’s population by Ukrainian authorities, or
Georgia’s treatment of the South Ossetian and Abkhaz populations.78 Certainly any
parallels with Kosovo are far-fetched.
Although there have been claims of violence directed against ethnic Russians
within Ukraine and legitimate fears over the safety of Russian groups as a result of a
surge in Ukrainian nationalism which underpinned the removal of the official status
enjoyed by minority languages in Ukraine,79 it is difficult to place this on any
comparable plane to those events which took place in Kosovo during the late
1990s.80 Notwithstanding President Putin’s invocation of pressures placed upon
72 According to the 2011 Abkhazian census. See http://unpo.org/members/7854.
73 See, eg., Permanent Committee on Geographical Names for British Official Use, Georgia: a toponymic
note concerning South Ossetia, www.pcgn.org.uk/Georgia%20-%20South%20Ossetia-Jan07.pdf.
74 See, eg., Cassese (1995: 119–120), Ryngaert and Griffisen (2009: 575–576) and Jaber (2011:
934–940).
75 Cassese (1995: 119–120). See also Knop (2002: 74).
76 Weller (2008: 59).
77 Quebec decision, paras. 113–114.
78 See, eg., NuBberger (2009: 355–358) and Sterio (2013: 149–152).
79 See Quigley (2014).
80 On atrocities in Kosovo, see, eg., O’Neill (2002: 21–35) and Independent International Commission on
Kosovo (2000: 33–83). For comparison of Crimea and Kosovo, see Malyarenko and Galbraith (2013).
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Russians and the ‘‘Kosovo precedent’’,81 as one commentator has noted ‘‘compar-
ison [of Kosovo] with Crimea is strained. Kiev’s rule is not as brutal as
Belgrade’s.’’82
Furthermore, the western response to events in Kosovo during 1999—when
NATO conducted military strikes against Serbian targets—was concerned solely
with the alleviation of humanitarian suffering.83 In sharp contrast, Russian
intervention in the Ukraine furthered the objective of the acquisition of Crimea,
undermining any apparently humanitarian objective. Russia’s own treatment of
sections of the Crimean population has also been heavily criticised on human rights
grounds.84
Intervention Leading to Secession and Annexation
Although any right of secession in international law arises only in narrowly
circumscribed circumstances, at the same time there is no prohibition upon acts of
secession as such. This much was confirmed by the ICJ in its advisory opinion upon
the legality of Kosovo’s declaration of independence.85 Where secession arises in
opposition to the will of the parent state, the response of the international
community is central to legitimising or condemning the resulting state of affairs.
Secession, or irredentism, is all the more controversial where it takes place against a
backdrop of external intervention, as this serves to undermine what may otherwise
be considered a lawful action. There is considerable support in international law for
the principle that states are obliged to withhold recognition from territorial changes
which are brought about by breaches of international legal norms, the so-called
doctrine of collective non-recognition.86 This point was arguably made clear in the
ICJ’s advisory opinion in the Kosovo case, where in relation to declarations of
independence it noted that, ‘‘Illegality attached to [some other] declarations of
independence…stemmed not from the unilateral character of these declarations as
such, but from the fact that they were, or would have been, connected with the
unlawful use of force or other egregious violations of norms of general international
law, in particular those of peremptory character (jus cogens).’’87
This view is reinforced by the international response to Northern Cyprus’
purported secession from Cyprus in a case bearing some striking similarities to that
of Crimea. Following intervention by Turkey, the Turkish Cypriot population in the
81 Speech of 18 March 2014.
82 Chesterman (2014: 2). See also Smith and Harari (2014: 26) and Malyarenko and Galbraith (2013:
918).
83 Although, for speculation as to ulterior motives on the part of intervening states, see Pinter (2000) and
Ali (2000). Significantly, Kosovo’s purported secession from Serbia came several years later and took the
form of a proclamation of independent statehood.
84 See Human Rights Watch (2014).
85 Accordance with international law of the unilateral declaration of independence in respect of Kosovo,
ICJ Rep 2010, 141.
86 See Orakhelashvili (2008: 25–31), Vidmar (2009: 827–849) and Caspersen (2012: 28–30).
87 Kosovo opinion, para. 81. See also Article 41, ILC Articles on State Responsibility 2001.
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north of the island were able to separate from the Greek dominated south,88 in a
manner akin to Crimea’s secession from Ukraine following Russian intervention.
Significantly, however, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus has not been
afforded recognition by any state other than Turkey.89 The UN Security Council
declared Northern Cyprus’ declaration of independence to be legally invalid and
called upon states to withhold recognition.90 Northern Cyprus’ purported secession
was also implicitly condemned by the UN General Assembly.91 Where territory is
regarded as having been annexed by an intervening state, the international
community has consistently condemned such developments.92 The only obvious
example of a situation in which recognition was extended to a change to the
territorial status quo aided by external intervention is that of Bangladesh, where the
secession of East Pakistan to form a new state was facilitated in large part by India’s
military intervention.93 However, this is hardly a comparable situation to that of
Crimea or Georgia’s secessionist entities, the catalogue of atrocities perpetrated
against the population of East Pakistan by the authorities of its parent state being
well documented.94
While the result of the Crimean referendum on the option of union with Russia
may well represent a reliable and authoritative expression of the wishes of a
majority of that territory’s population, especially given that a majority of the
population were ethnic Russians, it took place against the will of the parent state,
Ukraine. What is more, it was arguably only possible as a result of the role played
by Russia, an external actor. As Ukraine itself noted, ‘‘The declaration of
independence by the Crimean Republic is a direct consequence of the application of
the use of force and threats against Ukraine by the Russian Federation.’’95 Without
this it is inconceivable that any referendum or resulting territorial realignment of the
territory would have been possible. As Allison notes, ‘‘The core issue is that Russia
created an illegal territorial situation by using the threat of force,’’ the referendum
having taken place ‘‘in the intimidating presence of Russian troops.’’96 Russia’s role
in Crimea’s affairs mirrors to some extent its earlier involvement in South Ossetia
and Abkhazia, both of which enjoy de facto ‘independence’ from Georgia in no
small part due to the role played by Russia in their affairs. Both secessionist
campaigns were aided by Russian military intervention, which was particularly
decisive in the 2008 conflict.97 If Crimea’s incorporation within Russia is the result
88 On the case for remedial secession on the part of Turkish Cypriots, see Tocci (2003: 79–84) and Raic
(2012: 124–127).
89 See Ronen (1979: 61–70).
90 SC Res 541 (1983).
91 GA Res 253 (XXXVII) (1983).
92 For example, Iraq’s annexation of Kuwait was condemned by the Security Council (SC Res 662
(1990)), as was Israel’s annexation of East Jerusalem (SC Res 267 (1969)).
93 See Buchheit (1978: 198–214) and Castellino (2000: 147–172).
94 See Secretariat of the International Commission of Jurists report (1972).
95 UN Doc. S/PV.7144, 6.
96 Allison (2014: 1266).
97 See NuBberger (2013: paras. 26–30).
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of actions that constitute violations of international law, the international
community’s sweeping denunciation and rejection of it is appropriate.98
The territorial integrity of sovereign states within Europe is guaranteed by the
Helsinki Final Act.99 More significantly, Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter protects the
territorial integrity and political independence of states against the use of force
applied by other states. In respect of Crimea, serious issues of international law arise
concerning Russia’s intervention within Ukraine insofar as this may constitute a
violation of Article 2 (4), as well as other norms which safeguard states’ territory
against external intervention.100 Russia was also obliged to respect Ukraine’s
existing borders under the terms of bilateral agreements between the two states.101
Where the armed forces of one state cross the borders of another state, there is a
clear prima facie instance of unlawful intervention involving the use of force
contrary to Article 2 (4). Initially Russia denied having despatched forces to Crimea
prior to its referendum on union with Russia, but later admitted that Russian forces
had entered the province.102 Although the extent to which Russia used force against
the territorial integrity or political independence of the Ukraine may be debated, that
it intervened in Crimea and was responsible for the application of coercive measures
is largely undisputed.103 In any event it might also be noted that violations of Article
2 (4) can take more subtle forms. In the Nicaragua case, the International Court of
Justice noted that a state could be held responsible for the armed activities of third
party actors where these perform acts under its ‘‘effective control’’.104 In making
this point, the ICJ relied on the UN General Assembly’s earlier Definition of
Aggression,105 which acknowledged that acts of aggression by states could include
their sending of irregular forces.106 The onus is therefore on Russia to provide legal
justification for intervention which negates a prima facie violation of Article 2 (4) of
the UN Charter. Three principal possible justifications seem to have been hinted at
in official Russian rhetoric: counter-coup, invitation, and humanitarian intervention/
protection of nationals. These echoed Russian claims advanced at the time of its
98 A view heavily supported by many states. For discussion, see Corten (2015: 35–38).
99 See Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe Final Act 1975, Pt.I (a) (iv). See also Pt.I
(a) (i)–(iii) on sovereign equality, refraining from the threat or use of force, and inviolability of frontiers.
100 For example, the doctrine of non-intervention. See GA Res. 2131 (XX); GA Res. 2625 (XXV).
101 See Budapest Memorandum, 5 December 1994, paras. 1–2; Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and
Partnership 1997, Article 3. See further Marxsen (2014).
102 See ‘Putin’s remarks raise fears of future moves against Ukraine’, The Washington Post, 17 April
2014, www.washingtonpost.com/world/putin-changes-course-admits-russian-troops-were-in-crimea-
before-vote/2014/04/17/b3300a54-c617-11e3-bf7a-be01a9b69cf1_story.html.
103 See UN Doc. S/PV. 7124, 1 March 2014, 2–3 (comments of Deputy UN Secretary-General and
Ukrainian representative).
104 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of
America) (Merits), ICJ Rep, 1986, para. 115.
105 Nicaragua case, para. 195. UN GA Res. 3314 (XXIX).
106 See Wilson (2012: 183). See also Gray (2004: 108–120).
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earlier interventions in support of the secessionist regions within Georgia,107
although from some perspectives they ‘‘stretched legal credibility even further.’’108
The Ukrainian Parliament’s impeachment and removal of President Yanyuko-
vych was attacked by Russia as a western backed, illegal coup.109 Although the fact
that nearly three quarters of Ukrainian MPs voted to impeach him would appear to
have afforded some democratic legitimacy for the change of government in Kiev,
strictly speaking the terms of the Ukrainian constitution set a higher standard which
must be satisfied for impeachment to proceed.110 However, this is internationally
irrelevant. Irrespective of the merits of this course of action, this is a domestic and
not an international matter. It does not provide any legal authority for external
intervention. However, its relevance must be seen in the context of the two principal
justifications alluded to by Russia.
Russia claimed to have received an invitation from the ousted President
Yanyukovch to intervene.111 State authorities may invite foreign forces onto their
territories to assist in responding to crisis or conflict situations,112 but who exactly is
entitled to issue this invitation depends upon which of two approaches are adopted
in respect of the identification of the state’s government: the ‘effective control’ and
‘popular sovereignty’ models. The former attaches significance to a government’s
exercise of effective control within the state, whereas the latter looks to its
democratic legitimacy.113 International law appears to have provided no consistent
practice upon the approach to be taken,114although there is some evidence that the
latter has gained in support in recent years.115 Nonetheless, neither is particularly
helpful to Russia’s argument. Yanyukovych had lost effective control within the
Ukraine. Applying the ‘effective control’ theory of authority, this meant he had no
power to issue such an invitation. While the alternative ‘popular sovereignty’ theory
holds that a deposed leader or regime endowed with democratic legitimacy may still
107 Russia’s justifications for action taken in respect of South Ossetia and Abkhazia broadly revolved
around self-defence, fulfilment of peacekeeping functions, and the protection of civilians. See NuBberger
(2013: para. 29), Petro (2008: 1528–1537) and Toomey (2009: 464–465). A controversial aspect of
Russia’s purported justifications was to claim protection of Russian nationals in South Ossetia and
Abkhazia, these being essentially Georgian nationals it had dubiously conferred Russian citizenship upon
in order to be able to claim an interest in their treatment. See further Petro (2008: 1534), Higgins and
O’Reilly (2009: 582), Toomey (2009: 475–476) and Chatham (2011: 93–95).
108 Allison (2014: 1260).
109 See Speech by President Putin of 18 March 2014. See also UN Doc. S/PV.7134, at 15.
110 Article 111 sets out a series of procedures to be followed for a president to be removed following
impeachment, which do not appear to have been followed. Furthermore, the decision to remove
Yanyukovych did not quite receive the three quarters majority specified by Article 111.
111 See, eg., UN Doc. S/PV. 7124, above n91, 5. See further Allison (2014: 1264–5).
112 Note, for example, the UN Security Council’s welcoming of the French intervention in Mali at the
request of its government: SC Res. 2100 (2013). See also the judgment of the ICJ in Armed Activities on
the Territory of the Congo (DRC v Uganda), ICJ Rep, 2005, 168.
113 See Roth (1999: 136–149).
114 See Gray (2004: 83–87).
115 See, eg., Marxsen (2014: 374–380), for consideration of possible cases in which invitations
emanating from democratically elected governments lacking effective control have resulted in
intervention.
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be treated as the legitimate authority within the state, the scale of support for
Yanyukovych’s impeachment would suggest that the legitimacy conferred by
popular sovereignty now resided with the new regime in Kiev.
Although not explicitly invoking the controversial doctrine of humanitarian
intervention, Russia nonetheless referred to the need to protect Russian citizens
within the Ukraine,116 an argument advanced at the time of its equally controversial
incursion into the Georgian province of South Ossetia during 2008.117 While the
existence of a right of humanitarian intervention is doubtful in itself,118 even those
who advocate the existence of such a right set the threshold at which circumstances
will entitle its exercise at a much greater level of severity than that seen in the
treatment of the Russian population of Crimea.119 The legality of intervention for
the narrower objective of protecting nationals is also disputed.120 Furthermore,
Russia’s policy of conferring nationality on large numbers of inhabitants of Crimea
cast into doubt the validity of its claims in this regard. This approach was
reminiscent of its actions in the earlier South Ossetian incident, where ‘‘the
widespread distribution of Russian passports, especially to Ossetian residents, meant
that Russia was able to ‘manufacture’ a population of nationals in Georgia that it
claimed to be defending.’’121 The better view within international law is that
nationality claimed must be ‘real and effective’.122 In any event, there was little
evidence to suggest that this group faced any serious level of suffering at the hands
of the Ukrainian authorities.123
The Broader Legal and Political Context of Crimea
In legal terms, any assessment of events in Crimea—and indeed earlier episodes
involving secessionist pressures within the former Soviet space—is relatively
straightforward. There is no general right to secede within international law and
although secession is not prohibited either, the prevailing weight of international
legal opinion holds it to be invalid when (1) it occurs in the face of the opposition of
the parent state in the absence of exceptional circumstances which might warrant a
right of ‘remedial’ secession in accordance with the principles contained within the
116 See, eg., Putin speech of 18 March.
117 See Petro (2008: 1525–1533) and Musselman (2010: 329–336).
118 The literature which the topic has generated is voluminous. See, eg., Chesterman (2001), Wheeler
(2002) and Teson (2005).
119 See, eg., Cassese (1999: 27) who advocates that the requirements for humanitarian intervention
should include ‘‘gross and egregious breaches of human rights involving loss of life of hundreds or
thousands of innocent people, and amounting to crimes against humanity…’’, action to halt such atrocities
being taken by a group of states, with support or non-opposition of a majority of UN member states, and
the use of armed force being limited to halting the atrocities. None of these criteria were present in respect
of any Russian intervention in Crimea.
120 See, eg., Franck (2002: 76–96) and Gray (2004: 126–129).
121 Green (2014: 3).
122 Green (2014: 3). See Nottebohm (Liechtenstein v Guatemala), ICJ Rep 1955, 4.
123 See Allison (2014: 1262) and Marxsen (2014: 373–374).
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‘saving clause’ of the Friendly Relations declaration; and (2) it is effected by
external intervention. The Crimean episode exhibits both characteristics and the
international community has overwhelmingly declined to extend recognition to
Crimea’s purported union with Russia.
International law does not, however, operate in a vacuum. Its development is
informed by the actions of states, which in turn are driven by political agendas that
do not always conform with the dominant body of thought upon the correct
application of the core principles of international law. Regardless of the legal
relationship between statehood and recognition,124 on a practical level issues
pertaining to legal sovereignty over territory cannot be divorced from the political
effects of recognition. Russia’s intervention within Crimea may have produced a de
facto situation that is irreversible, but as with other recent assertions of Russian
authority in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the international community appears
unlikely to grant it the legitimating stamp of recognition. That secession and/or
union with another state may be successfully effected de facto does not of itself
have any legal bearing. This is apparent from the cases of East Timor,125 Western
Sahara,126 and Northern Cyprus,127 all of which were, or have, been occupied for
considerable periods of time with no resulting acceptance of any change to their
territorial status on the part of the international community. Indeed, as Almqvist has
noted, ‘‘from a practical standpoint, recognition is an essential condition for a new
state actually to exercise in an effective manner the international rights and
obligations that are incumbent on statehood and entering into relations with other
states and thus become a fully-fledged member of the international community.’’128
Of course, international political responses to the Crimean episode are complicated
by the fact that Crimea does not purport to exist as an independent state—in contrast
to, for example, Northern Cyprus—but rather as part of another state, Russia, which
must become the target of efforts designed to cause international isolation.
Sanctions have been imposed upon Russia in consequence of its intervention in
Ukraine,129 but the longer term effects of these remain to be seen and it must be
borne in mind that Russia is a major international power.
An important point which has been highlighted well by the Crimean episode is
the inconsistency with which some states will seek to invoke norms of international
law in support of their causes or to oppose the causes of others. It is a plausible
claim that every instance of attempted secession comes with its own unique
124 The more popular declaratory theory of recognition considers the effects of recognition to be merely
declaratory: they evidence a pre-existing fact, namely that X satisfies the criteria of statehood, or is part of
state Y. The constitutive theory deems a territory’s international status to be dependent upon the
recognition of others. For discussion of both theories, see, eg., Shaw (2008: 445–454).
125 See, eg., Ronen (1979: 54–61) and Sterio (2013: 103–113).
126 See Castellino (2000: 173–258). See, also, Cassese(1995: 214–218) and Knop (2002: 110–167).
127 See Tocci (2003).
128 Almqvist (2013: 165, 170). See also Dugard and Raic (2006: 98), who note that ‘‘It is…difficult to
maintain that an entity that has received recognition by none or very few states…can claim to be a State,
as it cannot demonstrate its capacity to enter into relations with other States.’’
129 See, eg., ‘How far do EU-US sanctions on Russia go?’, BBC News Online, 15 September 2014,
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-28400218.
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characteristics. Crimea is only the latest in a line of secessionist pressures which
continue to challenge fundamental international legal norms. The task of
international law is to ensure that these norms are clear, consistently applied, and
capable of responding to the diverse range of situations which arise to threaten
existing state boundaries. However, states remain the principal actors within
international law, and adherence on their part to a consistent interpretation of its
norms does not necessarily serve to complement their geopolitical objectives. It is
striking that Russia deployed arguments in support of its involvement in Crimea’s
affairs which appear to have rested in part upon the existence of a right of self-
determination for the population of Crimea,130 as well some kind of right of
humanitarian intervention (or protection of nationals) underpinning the legitimacy
of its intervention. Previously, Russia had displayed grave reluctance to acknowl-
edge the existence of a right of secession for disadvantaged groups,131 and had been
critical of justifications for military intervention claimed on humanitarian
grounds.132 It is even more remarkable that Russia claimed support for its actions
in the ‘Kosovo precedent’,133 given its condemnation of both the NATO led military
intervention against the FRY in response to atrocities committed against the
Kosovar Albanian population,134 as well as its outright rejection of any ground for
Kosovo’s later secession from Serbia.135 Significantly, however, Russia had
attempted to invoke notions of remedial secession in support of South Ossetian
and Abkhazian independence from Georgia,136 where such arguments potentially
furthered its cause.
Although detailed assessments of the geopolitical dimensions to the Crimean
episode are probably better left to scholars of international relations, an
understanding of these is helpful in order to appreciate the factors which have
driven the shift in legal rhetoric employed by Russia in attempts to legitimise its role
in developments within Crimea. Politically, the Crimean issue forms merely part of
a much larger regional power struggle. There is certainly a wider issue concerning
relations between Russia and Ukraine more generally, conflict between Ukrainian
authorities and Russian backed separatist groups having spread to other areas in the
south-east of Ukraine, principally Donetsk and Luhansk, which have proclaimed
their secession from the Ukraine and within which conflict continues to rage.
However, Russia’s interest in developments within Ukraine represents just one
130 See, eg., UN Doc. S/PV.7144, 8; UN Doc. A/68/PV. 80, 3.
131 See, eg., Memorandum on the maintenance of peace and stability in the CIS 1995, s.7, whereby the
parties—including Russia and Ukraine—agree ‘‘not to support separatist movements and separatist
regimes in [their territories]…if they arise.’’
132 For example, Russia was one of the sponsors of a draft Security Council resolution which condemned
NATO’s intervention against the FRY in response to the atrocities perpetrated in Kosovo. See UN Doc.
S/1999/328.
133 See Marxsen (2014: 384–388).
134 UN Doc. S/1999/328.
135 See Statement by Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Kosovo, of 17 February 2008, http://
archive.mid.ru//bdomp/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/041c5af46913d38ac32573f30
027b380!OpenDocument.
136 UN Doc. S/PV.5969, 6-9.
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aspect of its more general concern for the future development of its relations with its
neighbours within the former Soviet space. As noted by Allison, ‘‘Russian
intervention in Ukraine is rooted in the dynamics of security relations and relative
power.’’137 However, it ‘‘raises acute and more immediate uncertainties about future
Russian policy towards neighbouring states and the stability of interstate relations in
Eastern Europe…’’138 In the perspectives of several commentators, there has been a
resumption of ‘‘great power rivalry’’ between Russia and the West, which is
reminiscent in some respects of the Cold War.139 The main source of tension
concerns their respective degrees of influence within Russia’s near abroad. Having
already seen other former Soviet states drift towards integration within the EU—
Estonia,140 Latvia and Lithuania—as well as several former communist Eastern
European states, Russia’s foreign policy objectives include seeking to influence the
external relations of its neighbours141 in a manner akin to the operation of the
Monroe doctrine by the US.142 Ukraine’s apparent movement towards possible
absorption within EU and NATO structures was clearly a source of concern for
Russia.143 However, Ukraine is just one example within recent years of the playing
out of tensions between Russia and the West, and developments in Georgia and
Moldova in particular have also received Russia’s attention.144 In breakaway
regions within these states, ‘‘the Russian government has supported separatism…the
key element of Putin’s strategy is to use these breakaway regions as perches from
which to threaten the larger states that once governed them..Russian military forces
operate in these regions and guarantee their security.’’145 A deterioration in relations
between Russia and pro-Russian regimes and western powers has already taken
place and this latest episode threatens to harden these fault lines and potentially
return the state of geopolitical affairs to one dominated by a new Cold War.
Conclusions
Prima facie, it is possible to draw some relatively simple conclusions from the
Crimean episode. The prevailing weight of international legal opinion holds that
Crimea’s incorporation within Russia is unlawful. Although secession is not
expressly prohibited under international law, nor is there a general right of secession
and each instance must be judged with reference to its particular circumstances. It is
certainly a tall claim to suggest that the Crimean population has suffered some
137 Allison (2014: 1269).
138 Allison (2014: 1256).
139 See, eg., Trenin (2014), March (2011), Malyarenko and Galbraith (2013: 920–926).
140 Estonia has an ethnic Russian population of 25 % according to the 2011 census, data available at
www.stat.ee.
141 See Smith and Hariri (2014: 37–38).
142 For a definition and overview of the Monroe doctrine, see Grant (2013).
143 See further Allison (2014: 1269–1275).
144 See Trenin (2014: 15–18). See also Allison (2014: 1275–1277).
145 Cullen Dunn and Bobick (2014: 406).
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sufficiently severe oppressive treatment of the kind which would justify the exercise
of a right of ‘remedial secession’. More important, however, is the widespread
acceptance of the rule against recognition of territorial changes brought about by an
unlawful act such as the use of force, as Russia’s intervention within the territory of
the Ukraine was clearly understood to be. The clear international consensus upon
the Crimean episode should be apparent from the widespread condemnation of
Crimea’s incorporation within Russia, evidenced by resolutions of the UN Security
Council and General Assembly.
Beyond legal pronouncements upon its validity, the process through which
sovereignty over Crimea has effectively been removed from one state and handed to
another highlight two fundamental difficulties inherent in the operation of
international law within a world beset by geopolitical forces. Firstly, states are
driven to act out of political or strategic objectives which are not always compatible
with relevant norms of international law. Secondly, as a consequence, international
legal norms find themselves stretched, reinterpreted, and inconsistently applied as
best suits a given state’s objectives in the circumstances. This does not mean those
norms lose their force, but it does become crucial that the international community
unites in opposing dubious legal claims. On this occasion it would appear that it has
done so.
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